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1. Introduction
A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is also known as a vehicular sensor network
[Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008)] by which driving safety is enhanced through inter-vehicle
communications or communications with roadside infrastructure. It is an important element
of the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) [Wang et al. (2006)]. In a typical VANET,
each vehicle is assumed to have an on-board unit (OBU) and there are road-side units (RSU)
installed along the roads. A trusted authority (TA) and maybe some other application servers
are installed in the backend. The OBUs and RSUs communicate using the Dedicated Short
Range Communications (DSRC) protocol [Oh et al. (1999)] over the wireless channel while
the RSUs, TA, and the application servers communicate using a secure fixed network (e.g.
the Internet). Based on this infrastructure, vehicles can broadcast safety messages (e.g. road
condition, traffic accident information), referred to as ”ad hoc messages”, to other nearby
vehicles and RSU such that other vehicles may adjust their travelling routes and RSU may
inform the traffic control center to adjust traffic lights for avoiding possible traffic congestion.
Like other communication networks, security issues have to be well addressed. For example,
the message from an OBU has to be integrity-checked and authenticated. Otherwise, an
attacker can replace the safety message from a vehicle or even impersonate a vehicle to
transmit a fake safety message. For example, an attacker may impersonate an ambulance
to request other vehicles to give way to it or request nearby RSUs to change traffic lights to
green. Besides, privacy is another important issue. A driver may not want others to know
its driving routes by tracing messages sent by its OBU. Thus an anonymous communications
protocol is needed. While being anonymous, a vehicle’s real identity should be revealable by
a trusted party when necessary. For example, the driver who sends out fake messages causing
an accident should not be able to evade responsibility by using an anonymous identity.
In terms of integrity-checking and authentication, digital signature in conventional public
key infrastructure (PKI) [Housley et al. (1999)] is a well accepted choice. However, requiring
a vehicle to verify the signatures of other vehicles by itself using such schemes as in
[Tsang & Smith (2008)] induces two problems as mentioned in [Zhang, Lin, Lu & Ho (2008)].
First, the computation power of an OBU is not adequate to handle all verifications in
a short time, especially in places where the traffic density is high. Second, to verify a
message from an unknown vehicle involves the transmission of a public key certificate which
causes heavy message overhead. Therefore, the general approach is to let the nearby RSU
help a vehicle verify the message of another. The volume of signatures to be verified can
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be huge (each vehicle is expected to broadcast a safety message every few hundred ms
[U.S. Department of Transportation (2006)]). An efficient method for verifying a batch of
signatures within a short period of time is desirable.
Another motivation of our work is the observation that VANET can provide a platform
for a group of known vehicles (e.g. police chasing a bank robber) to establish a secure
communication channel (group communications). Since communication is through a wireless
channel and is more vulnerable to attacks and member vehicles would leave the group and
join the group again (e.g. at junctions) rather frequently, it is desirable to have an efficient
frequent group key update procedure to accommodate dynamic membership in such a group
communications scheme.
To conclude, besides security and privacy requirements, an ad hoc communications protocol
for VANETs should have lowmessage overhead and efficient message verificationmechanism
while having high success rate and low delay. The group communications protocol should be
efficient for dynamic membership as well as frequent group key update. Existing solutions
cannot satisfy all these requirements. Section 2describes related work and their limitations.
In this chapter, we propose a Grouping-enabled and Privacy-enhancing communications
Scheme (or GPS in short form) for VANETs. Our schemes can handle ”ad hoc messages”
(those sent by arbitrary vehicles) as well as allow vehicles that know one another in advance
to form a group and send ”group messages” securely among themselves. In summary, our
schemes have the following features:
1) Our schemes are software-based and do not rely on any special hardware.
2) By establishing shared secrets with RSU and TA on the handshaking phase, a vehicle is
allowed to use a different pseudo identity for each session (or message) to protect its privacy
while the real identity is traceable only by TA.
3) We make use of the techniques of binary search in RSU message verification phase and
bloom filter in notification messages to reduce the message overhead substantially and
enhance the effectiveness of the verification phase.
4) Any vehicle can form a group with other vehicles after an initial handshaking phase with
a nearby RSU and then authenticate and communicate with others (either to all members or
to a dedicated member) securely without the intervention of RSU even after moving into the
region of another RSU.
5) We support dynamic membership in a group. When a new member
wants to join an existing group or an existing member wants to leave a group, there is no need
to form a new group from scratch.
6) The group secure key can be updated periodicallywithout any help from an RSU to increase
the security level of the communication.
We provide a security analysis on our schemes and an analysis on the effectiveness of using
bloom filter in the notification messages. Through analysis and simulation studies, we show
that our schemes can reduce the message overhead and increase the verification success
rate (will be formally defined in Section 8) by at least 45% while the additional overhead is
insignificant when compared to the existing solutions.
2. State of the art
The problem of secure communications has been studied in other mobile ad hoc networks
(e.g. [Kim et al. (2004)] and [Wong et al. (1998)]). However, VANET has its own characteristics
which make the solutions for MANET not applicable. In brief, although mobile ad hoc
network does not have a fixed topology, it may still be feasible to assume a rough topological
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structure such as cluster-based, tree-based or hierarchical, and nodes in a MANET move
relatively slowly. On the other hand, these assumptions are no longer valid in VANETs. In a
VANET, vehicles are moving at high speed and the topology changes rapidly. There are other
issues that make the problem in VANETs unique. Interested readers can refer to [Hubaux et al.
(2004)] and [Raya et al. (2006)] for more details.
Ad hoc communications in VANETs have been addressed in two recent
work [Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008); Zhang, Lin, Lu & Ho (2008)]. In
[Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008)], the IBV protocol was proposed for vehicle-to-RSU
communications. The RSU can verify a large number of signatures as a batch using just
three pairing operations (see Section 4 for what a pairing operation is). However, their
work has some limitations. First, their protocol relies heavily on a tamper-proof hardware
device, installed in each vehicle, which preloads the system-wide secret key. Once one of
these devices is cracked, the whole system will be compromised. Second, a vehicle’s real
identity can be traced by anyone, thus the protocol does not satisfy the privacy requirement.
Third, their protocol has a flaw such that a vehicle can use a fake identity to avoid being
traced (anti-traceability attack) or even impersonate another vehicle (impersonation attack
1). Fourth, in their batch verification scheme, if any of the signatures is erroneous, the whole
batch will be dropped. This is inefficient because most signatures in the batch may actually
be valid. Finally, the IBV protocol is not designed for vehicle-to-vehicle communications.
In a more recent work [Zhang, Lin, Lu & Ho (2008)], the RAISE protocol was proposed for
vehicle-to-vehicle communications. The protocol is software-based. It allows a vehicle to
verify the signature of another with the aid of a nearby RSU. However, no batch verification
can be done and the RSU has to verify signatures one after another. On the other hand, to
notify other vehicles whether a message from a certain vehicle is valid, a hash value of 128
bytes needs to be broadcasted. There can be tens or even up to thousands of signatures within
a short period of time, thus the notification messages induce a heavy message overhead.
Group communications in VANETs, on the other hand, have been considered in three
papers [Chim, Yiu, Hui, Jiang & Li (2009); Wasef & Shen (2008); Verma & Huang (2009)]. In
[Chim, Yiu, Hui, Jiang & Li (2009)], a scheme is proposed to allow a set of vehicles to form
a group with the help of an RSU such that subsequently, encrypted group messages can be
broadcasted by any member to all other members without the intervention of RSU. While
group messages can be authenticated to be sent by valid members, the scheme also satisfies
the privacy-preserving property that the real identity of the sender cannot be linked to the
messages (except by TA) to protect the route of the vehicles being traced by unauthorized
parties. However, the scheme assumes that the vehicles in the group are static in the sense
that no mechanism is provided if a new member wants to join an existing group or an existing
member wants to leave the group. Also, wireless channel is more vulnerable to attacks, and
it is important to have an efficient scheme to update the group key periodically without the
help of a third party. So, to handle dynamic membership of a group and key update based on
[Chim, Yiu, Hui, Jiang & Li (2009)], we need to go through the group formation scheme from
scratch with the help of an RSU.
In [Wasef & Shen (2008)], the PPGCV protocol was proposed. In addition to a scheme for
group formation, they provide a protocol to update the group key. However, the setting of
their scheme is different from a typical VANET and the key update process relies heavily on a
key server which holds the set of all keys distributed to the vehicles.
1Please refer to the Appendix or [Chim, Yiu, Hui & Li (2009)] for the attacks.
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In [Verma & Huang (2009)], another group communications protocol, SeGCom, was
proposed. However, its concern is totally different from ours and privacy is not considered.
Also RSUs are assumed to be fully trusted but this is unrealistic in practice. Furthermore, a
vehicle can only form a group with all vehicles that are in the same RSU’s range. It cannot
select vehicles to form a group with. In all three papers, the noise of the wireless channels
was not adequately addressed. We found that the success rate for forming a group degrades
substantially as the noise increases in the channel.
3. Problem statement
3.1 System model and assumptions
Recall that a vehicular network consists of on-board units (OBUs) installed on vehicles,
road-side units (RSUs) along the roads, and a trusted authority (TA). We focus on the
inter-vehicle communications over the wireless channel. We assume the following:
1. The TA is always online and trusted. RSUs and TA communicate through a secure fixed
network. To avoid being a single point of failure or a bottleneck, redundant TAs which
have identical functionalities and databases are installed.
2. RSUs have higher computation power than OBUs.
3. The RSU to Vehicle Communication (RVC) range is at least twice of the Inter-Vehicle
Communication (IVC) range to ensure that if an RSU receives a message, all vehicles
receiving the same message are in the feasible range to receive the notification from the
RSU. Consider the following counter example. Assume that the RVC range and the IVC
range are both r. Two vehicles V1 and V2 are r apart. The distance between V1 and RSU is
within r but that between V2 and RSU is larger than r. If V1 sends a message to V2, V2 has
no way to verify it as it cannot receive the notification message from the RSU. However,
this problem can be resolved if the RVC range is twice that of IVC.
4. There exists a conventional public key infrastructure (PKI) for initial handshaking. The
public key of TA PKTA is known by everyone. The public key of vehicle Vi PKVi is known
by TA. Also any RSU Rk broadcasts its public key PKRk with hello messages periodically
to vehicles that are travelling within RVC range of it. Thus PKR is known by all vehicles
nearby. The TA and RSU Rk keep their secret keys SKTA and SKRk privately. There is no
need for vehicles to know the public keys of other vehicles to avoid message overhead for
exchanging certificates.
5. The real identity of any vehicle is only known by TA and itself but not by others.
3.2 Security requirements
We aim at designing schemes to satisfy the following security requirements:
1 Message integrity and authentication: A vehicle should be able to verify that a message is
indeed sent and signed by another vehicle without being modified by anyone.
2 Identity privacy preserving: The real identity of a vehicle should be kept anonymous from
other vehicles and a third party should not be able to reveal a vehicle’s real identity by
analysing multiple messages sent by it.
3 Traceability: Although a vehicle’s real identity should be hidden from other vehicles, if
necessary, TA should have the ability to obtain a vehicle’s real identity and relate the
message to the sender (for example, in case the real identity of the sender of a fake message
causing an accident needs to be revealed).
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4 Confidentiality: Group messages broadcasted to all members should not be decryptable by
vehicles not in the group and a group message sent to a dedicated member should only
be decryptable by that dedicated receiver, other vehicles (including other members) should
not be able to decrypt the message.
4. Preliminaries
Our schemes are pairing-based and defined on two cyclic groups with a bilinear mapping
[Menezes (1991)]. We briefly introduce what a bilinear map is and will discuss the basics
on bloom filter which we apply in the RSU notification phase.
4.1 Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)
Let G be a cyclic additive group with generator P and GT be a cyclic multiplicative group.
Both groups G and GT have the same prime order q. The mapping eˆ : G ×G → GT is called a
bilinear map if it satisfies the following properties:
1. Bilinear: ∀P,Q,R ∈ G and ∀a,b ∈ Z, eˆ(Q,P + R) = eˆ(P + R,Q) = eˆ(P,Q) · eˆ(R,Q). Also
eˆ(aP,bP) = eˆ(P,bP)a = eˆ(aP,P)b = eˆ(P,P)ab.
2. Non-degenerate: There exists P,Q ∈ G such that eˆ(P,Q) = 1GT .
3. Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) for any P,Q ∈ G.
The bilinear map eˆ can be constructed on elliptic curves. Each operation for computing
eˆ(P,Q) is a pairing operation. Pairing operation is the most expensive operation in this kind
of cryptographic schemes. The fewer the number of pairing operations, the more efficient the
scheme is. The groupsG and GT are called bilinear groups. The security of our schemes relies
on the fact that the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) on bilinear groups is computationally
hard, i.e., given the point Q= aP, there exists no efficient algorithm to obtain a by given P and
Q. The implication is that we can transfer Q in an open wireless channel without worrying
that a (usually some secret) can be known by the attackers.
4.2 Bloom filter
A bloom filter is a method for representing a set A = a1, a2, ..., an of n elements to support
membership queries. The idea is to allocate a vector v with m bits, initially all set to 0, and
then choose k independent hash functions, h1, h2, ..., hk, each with range 1, ..., m. For each
element a ∈ A, the bits at the positions h1(a), h2(a), ..., hk(a) in v are set to 1 (A particular
bit might be set to 1 multiple times). To answer if a value b is in A, we check the bits at
positions h1(b), h2(b), ..., hk(b). If any of them is 0, then b is definitely not in the set A.
Otherwise we conjecture that b is in the set although there is a certain probability that we
are wrong (called a false positive). After inserting n keys into the vector with m bits with k
hash functions, the probability that a particular bit is still 0 is (1− 1m )
kn ∼ e−
kn
m assuming that
on any input value, the hash functions pick each position with equal probability. Hence the
probability of a false positive is (1− (1− 1m )
kn)k ∼ (1− e−
kn
m )k. Let f (k) = (1− e−
kn
m )k and
let g(k) = ln f (k) = kln(1− e−
kn
m ). By finding dgdk and making
dg
dk = 0, it can be shown that to
minimize the probability of having false positives, k should be set to m ln2n .
5. Our scheme for ad hoc communications
This section presents our scheme for ad hoc communications in details. There are some initial
parameters to be generated by TA using the following steps. This needs to be done once
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for the whole system unless the master key, or the real identity of a vehicle are believed to
be compromised, or TA wants to update the parameters and the master key periodically to
enhance the security level of the system.
(1) TA chooses G and GT that satisfy the bilinear map properties.
(2) TA randomly picks s ∈ Zq as its master key and computes Ppub = sP as its public key. The
public parameters {G, GT, q, P, Ppub} are publicly accessible by all RSUs and vehicles.
(3) TA assigns each vehicle Vi a real identity RIDi ∈ G and a password PWDi. The drivers are
informed about them during network deployment or during vehicle first registration.
Our scheme can be divided into the following modules:
(A) Initial handshaking: This module is executed when a vehicle meets a new RSU. The vehicle
authenticates itself with TA via RSU. Note that TA is the only authorized party which knows
the real identity of the vehicle, so TA will pass information to RSU to allow RSU to verify the
vehicle’s signature even if it uses pseudo identity to sign the message. Also, RSUwill generate
a shared secret with the vehicle. If this is the first time the vehicle authenticates itself with TA,
TA will also pass its master key s and a shared secret to the vehicle. This only needs to be done
once in the whole session. To increase the security level, s is not preloaded into any hardware
on the vehicle as in [Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008)]. For the shared secret with RSU, a new
secret is generated every time the vehicle moves into the region of another RSU.
(B) Message signing: When a vehicle wants to send out a message, it first creates a pseudo
identity together with the signing key. This can be done per message to increase the difficulty
of attackers attempting to trace its real identity. Then, it signs the message using the signing
key of the pseudo identity.
(C) Batch verification: This module is used by the RSU to verify a set of messages using only
two pairing operations in a batch mode. We also describe how to generate a notification
broadcast message using bloom filter and how to handle the case in which there are some
invalid signatures in the batch (recall that in [Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008)], once there is
an invalid signature in the batch, the whole batch of signatures are assumed to be invalid and
ignored).
(D) Real identity tracking: This module is used by TA to reveal the real identity of the sender of
a given message.
5.1 Initial handshaking
Fig. 1. Initial handshaking
We use the notations CENCZ(M), CDECZ(M) and CSIGZ(M) to denote conventional
encrypting, decrypting and signing, respectively, message M using the key Z. To enhance
readability, we summarize the notations that will be used in this chapter in Table 1. The
detailed processes in this module are as follows:
1. When a vehicle Vi meets the first RSU Rk, it encrypts its RIDi and PWDi using TA’s public
key PKTA and sends ENCPKTA(RIDi,PWDi,r) to the RSU which forwards it to TA. Here
RIDi, PWDi and r are concatenated in a pre-defined way and r is a random nonce. By
including r, two similar blocks sent by the same vehicle cannot be related by an attacker.
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Symbol Meaning
CENCZ(M) Encrypting message M using the key Z
CDECZ(M) Decrypting message M using the key Z
CSIGZ(M) Signing message M using the key Z
H(.) MapToPoint hash function [Boneh et al. (2001)]
h(.) One-way hash function such as SHA-1 [Eastlake & Jones (2001)]
r random number
TA Trusted authority
Rk RSU number k
Vi Vehicle number i
PKTA Public key of TA
SKTA Secret key of TA
PKRk Public key of RSU Rk
SKRk Secret key of RSU Rk
PKVi Public key of vehicle Vi
s TA’s master key
{G, GT, q, P, Ppub = sP} Public parameters
RIDi Real identity of vehicle Vi
PWDi Password of vehicle Vi
ti Shared secret between TA and vehicle Vi
mi Shared secret between RSU Rk and vehicle Vi
Mi/Mr Messages sent by vehicle / RSU
IDi Pseudo identity of vehicle Vi
VPKi Verification public key of vehicle Vi
SKi = (SKi1,SKi2) Signing key of vehicle Vi
σi ECC signature by vehicle Vi
LIDi Local pseudo identity of vehicle Vi (for group communications)
GPKi Group public key of vehicle Vi (for group communications)
LSKi = (LSKi1,LSKi2) Local signing key of vehicle Vi (for group communications)
ς j Local ECC signature by vehicle Vi (for group communications)
rr Partial group secret key (for group communications)
β Group secret key (for group communications)
Table 1. Notations used in this chapter
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2. TA decrypts and verifies RIDi and PWDi. If they are valid, it generates a shared secret ti for
Vi and computes Vi’s ID Verification Public Key as VPKi = ti ⊕ RIDi. TA then passes VPKi
to RSU to enable it to verify signatures from Vi even if Vi uses pseudo identity to sign the
message. TA then stores the (RIDi, ti) pair into its repository and forwards PKVi , VPKi and
X = ENCPKVi (s,VPKi,SIGSKTA(s,VPKi)) to RSU, where PKR and PKVi are conventional
public keys of RSU and vehicle Vi, respectively. Note that to let Vi know that s and VPKi
are really sent by TA, TA includes its signature on s and VPKi (CSIGSKTA(s,VPKi)) into the
encrypted text.
3. RSU chooses a random number mi to be the shared secret between itself and vehicle Vi .
It stores the (VPKi, mi) pair into its verification table for later usage. It then sends Y =
ENCPKVi (mi,CSIGSKR(mi)) and X to vehicle Vi. Again to let vehicle Vi know that mi is
really sent by RSU, RSU signs it.
4. Vehicle Vi decrypts Y to obtain mi and verifies RSU’s signature on it. Similarly, it decrypts
X to obtain s and VPKi and verifies TA’s signature on them. It then computes its shared
secret with TA using t = VPKi ⊕ RIDi.
This basically completes the initial handshaking phase. The following shows the procedure
when vehicle Vi leaves the range of an RSU and enters the range of another. It includes a
simpler authentication process with TA so that TA can pass the information to the new RSU
for verifying Vi’s signature and a new shared secret will be generated by this RSU.
5) Vi sends ENCPKTA(RIDi) to TA via this new RSU. This time TA does not need to verify
Vi’s PWD anymore as it has already done that when Vi first starts up. Instead it directly
generates a new ti and a new VPKi for Vi and sends VPKi to the new RSU. TA then adds
the new ti into its repository. Next the new RSU chooses a random number mi to be its
shared secret with Vi. After storing (VPKi,mi) into its verification table, RSU sends Y =
ENCPKVi (mi,CSIGSKR(mi)) to Vi which then decrypts it using its conventional secret key.
From now on, vehicle Vi starts to use the new shared secret with the new RSU for message
signing.
5.2 Message signing
Fig. 2. Message signing
To sign a message, a vehicle generates a pseudo identity and the corresponding signing key.
A different pseudo identity can be used for a different message.
To generate a pseudo identity, Vi first generates a random nonce r. Its pseudo identity IDi
contains two parts - IDi1 and IDi2 where IDi1 = rPpub and IDi2 = VPKi ⊕ H(miIDi1). The
corresponding signing key is SKi = (SKi1,SKi2) where SKi1 = smi IDi1 and SKi2 = sH(IDi2).
H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function [Boneh et al. (2001)]. Then, to sign a message Mi, Vi
computes the signature σi = SKi1 + h(Mi)SKi2 where h(.) is a one-way hash function such as
SHA-1 [Eastlake & Jones (2001)]. Vehicle Vi then sends < IDi, Mi, σi > to others.
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Fig. 3. Batch verification
5.3 Batch verification
This module allows an RSU to verify a batch of signatures using only two pairing operations
based on the bilinear property of the bilinear map. We require an RSU to perform batch
verification at a frequency higher than that with which a vehicle broadcasts safety messages
so that a vehicle can verify the safety message of another before it broadcasts a more updated
one. We first show the verification procedure. Then, we show how to make use of bloom
filter to construct a notification message in order to reduce the message overhead. Lastly,
we describe how to handle the case in which there are invalid signatures in the batch
and how to extract valid ones from the batch instead of dropping the whole batch as in
[Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008)].
Verification procedure. Assume that RSU wants to verify a batch of signatures σ1, σ2, ..., σn
from vehicles V1, V2, ..., Vn on messages M1, M2, ..., Mn. With the shared secrets and
the pseudo identities of the vehicles, RSU first determines their verification public keys
VPK1,VPK2, . . . ,VPKn and shared secrets m1,m2, . . . ,mn by checking which of the stored
(VPKi,mi) pairs satisfy IDi2 = VPKi ⊕ H(mi IDi1). It then verifies the signatures by checking
if eˆ(∑ni=1 σi,P) = eˆ(∑
n
i=1mi IDi1 + h(Mi)H(IDi2),Ppub) as
eˆ(∑ni=1σi,P)
= eˆ(∑ni=1SKi1 + h(Mi)SKi2,P)
= eˆ(∑ni=1SKi1,P)eˆ(∑
n
i=1 h(Mi)SKi2,P)
= eˆ(∑ni=1 smi IDi1,P)eˆ(∑
n
i=1 h(Mi)sH(IDi2),P)
= eˆ(∑ni=1mi IDi1, sP)eˆ(∑
n
i=1 h(Mi)H(IDi2), sP)
= eˆ(∑ni=1mi IDi1,Ppub)eˆ(∑
n
i=1 h(Mi)H(IDi2),Ppub)
= eˆ(∑ni=1mi IDi1 + h(Mi)H(IDi2),Ppub).
To avoid replay attack, an RSU stores the pseudo identities used by vehicles. If the pseudo
identity in a vehicle’s message matches any stored one, RSU rejects the message immediately.
Note that if a vehicle does not know the shared secret with RSU, it cannot produce a valid
signature. There may be a very small chance that the pseudo identities generated by two
vehicles are the same. In that case, RSU will treat the signatures as invalid. The vehicles will
sign again using a different pseudo identity.
Generating notification message. After RSU verifies vehicle Vi’s signature σi, it notifies all
vehicles within its RVC range the result. We first assume that all signatures are valid. For
each valid message, we store a hash value h(IDi,Mi) of the message in the bloom filter (the
hashing function is known to everyone) to minimize message overhead. However, as we have
discussed in Section 4.2, there can be false positives in a bloom filter. To reduce this impact,
we propose to use two bloom filters which contain opposite information: Positive and Negative
Filter. The positive bloom filter stores the hash value of pseudo identities and messages of
vehicles whose signatures are valid and the negative bloom filter stores the hash value of
pseudo identities and messages of vehicles whose signatures are invalid.
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If vehicle Vi wants to verify vehicle Vj’s signature σj on message Mj, it first computes
h(IDi ,Mi) and then checks the positive filter and the negative filter as included in the RSU
broadcast. There are four possible cases (see Table 2). For the first two cases, the resulting
validity of σj can be confirmed. For the third case, Vj’s hash appears in both filters. Then this
must be a false positive in either filter, thus a re-confirmation procedure is needed. For the
last case, Vj’s hash does not appear in both filters. It means that RSU still has not yet verified
σj and so Vi has to wait for RSU’s next broadcasting message.
To facilitate re-confirmation, we require a vehicle to store the signatures of other vehicles
which they are interested in upon receiving them for the first time for a short period. Also
we require RSU to store the valid signatures that it has verified together with the sending
vehicles’ pseudo identities for at least one more batch verification period after that signature
is lastly requested.
If Case 3 occurs, vehicle Vi re-sends σj to RSU. RSU searches for σj from those stored
signatures. If σj can be found, RSU adds the hash of Vj into the positive filter. Otherwise,
it adds it into the negative filter. All re-confirmation results can be embedded into a
re-confirmation reply similar to a normal notification message. In practice, we can use one bit
to distinguish whether the reply is a normal notification message or a re-confirmation reply.
Case Positive Filter Negative Filter Validity of σj
1 True False Valid
2 False True Invalid
3 True True (Re-confirmation needed)
4 False False (Wait for next broadcast)
Table 2. Possible cases in bloom filters and their implications
There is still a chance that Case 3 occurs again. Our scheme allows the use of bloom filters
for re-confirmation for K rounds. If after K rounds and Case 3 still occurs, RSU will send
h(IDj ,Mj) of Vj to vehicle Vi as a direct notification. To facilitate RSU to know what it should
send in the re-confirmation reply, RSU stores the number of requests to each of its signature
stored. See the next section for the performance of our schemes with different values of K.
Note that the size of each bloom filter m (i.e. the number of bits used) can be a variable in our
schemes to save transmission overhead. To help the receiving vehicles to determine the size
of the filters (so that they can adjust the range of hash functions accordingly), together with
the valid and the invalid filters, RSU also transmits a value n to represent the total number
of signatures in the batch (i.e. the number of values being added into any bloom filter cannot
exceed n). To allow vehicles to confirm that a notification message is indeed sent by an RSU,
RSU signs the bloom filters using its private key SKR before broadcasting them.
Invalid signatures in the batch. Abatch may contain tens and even up to thousands of signatures
depending on the traffic density around RSU. In the IBV protocol, if any of the signatures
inside the batch is invalid, the whole batch is dropped. This approach is inefficient in the
sense that most of the signatures in the batch are actually valid and can be used. Thus in our
schemes, we propose to adopt binary search in the verification process to extract those valid
ones. Assume that the batch contains n signatures, we arrange them in a fixed order (say
according to the senders’ pseudo identities). If the batch verification fails, we first determine
the mid-point as mid =  1+n2 	. Then we perform batch verification on the first half (the 1
st to
midth elements) and the second half (the (mid+ 1)th to nth elements) separately. If any of the
two batches causes a failure in the verification again, we repeat the same process on the invalid
batch. If the pairing on any batch is valid, the RSU notifies all those signatures immediately.
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The binary search stops if a batch contains only one signature or when a pre-defined level
of binary search is reached. In Section 8, we evaluate the performance of our schemes using
different number of levels in binary search and it is found that a full exploration may not be
necessary in most cases.
5.4 Real identity tracking
To reveal the real identity of the sender of a message, TA is the only authorized party that
can perform the tracing. Given vehicle Vi’s pseudo identity IDi and its shared secret with the
connecting RSU mi, TA can search through all the stored (RIDj, tj) pairs from its repository.
Vehicle Vi’s real identity is the RIDj value from the entry that satisfies the expression IDi2 ⊕
tj ⊕ H(miIDi1) = RIDj as IDi2⊕ tj⊕ H(mi IDi1) = ti ⊕ RIDj⊕ H(miIDi1)⊕ ti⊕ H(miIDi1) =
RIDj. No other party can obtain vehicle Vi’s real identity since ti is only known by TA and Vi
itself.
6. Our scheme for group communications
This section presents our scheme for group communications in details. This scheme is based
on the framework of our ad hoc communications scheme in Section 5. The scheme can be
divided into the following modules:
(A) Group formation: This module is used when a set of vehicles want to form a group. A
group partial secret key and a set of group public keys for group members will be generated
by TA and forwarded by an RSU.
(B) Secure one-to-many and one-to-one communications: This module describes how a vehicle can
send a message securely to all other members or to a dedicated member in the group.
(C)Newmember joining: This module is invokedwhen a newmemberwants to join an existing
group.
(D) Common group secret update: This module shows how the common group secret can be
updated without the help of RSU.
(E) Member leaving: This module is invoked when a member wants to leave a group.
(F) Real identity tracking: This module is used by TA to reveal the real identity of the sender of
a given message.
6.1 Group formation
Fig. 4. Group Key Generation
When a group of vehicles want to form a group, each of them first creates a pseduo identity
together with the signing key. This can be done per message to increase the difficulty of
attackers to trace its real identity. Then, it signs a control message using the signing key of the
pseudo identity. RSU verifies the set of control messages using only two pairing operations
in a batch mode and distributes necessary information to vehicles in a group so that they can
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verify each others’ messages without the aid of any RSU later on. A partial group secret key
will also be generated. Details are as follow.
Assume that vehicles V1, V2, ..., Vn have already registered with the closest RSU and their
shared secrets with RSU are m1, m2, ..., mn respectively. Also assume that these vehicles know
pseudo identities of one another already.
Group request. Vehicle Vi generates the group request message Mi =
{GPREQ, ID1, ID2, ..., IDi−1, IDi+1, ..., IDn} and its signature σi on Mi using the method
in Section 5.2. Here IDj for all j = i is the pseudo identity lastly used by Vj as heard by Vi. Vi
then broadcasts < IDi,Mi,σi > to RSU and others. Note that Vi can be anyone or the leader
of the group.
Group agree. Any vehicle Vj receiving Vi’s GPREQ message checks whether its lastly used
pseudo identity is included in the GPREQ message. If yes, it composes the message Mj =
{GPAGR, IDj} and its signature σj on it and sends < IDj,Mj,σj > to RSU. Note that vehicle
Vj generates IDj and σj using the method in Section 5.2 above.
Verification and key generation. At fixed intervals, RSU verifies the group request and group
agree messages. Note that there is a method to batch verify a set of incoming signatures
as we discussed in Section 5.3. For any vehicle Vx whose signature is found to be valid,
it generates its group public key as GPKx = mxP and stores it into the verification table.
Besides, it also generates a random number rr which will be used to form the group
secret key among the group of vehicles. Without loss of generality, assume the signatures
from V1, ..., Vx are valid, RSU broadcasts Mr = {ID1, ID2, ..., IDx,GPK1,GPK2, ...,GPKx,
CENCm1(rr),CENCm2(rr), ...,CENCmx(rr)} and its signature CSIGCSKR(Mr) to the vehicles
concerned.
In case the verification fails due to invalid signatures or vehicles inside the range have the
same pseudo identity (although the chance is very small), RSU will stop the protocol and the
group is required to repeat the protocol again for the sake of security.
Key reception and acknowledgement. Upon receiving RSU’s broadcast, each vehicle Vi in the
group acknowledges RSU by composing Mi = {KEYRECV} and sending out the reply <
IDi,Mi,σi >. Note that IDi and σi are generated in the same way as in the group request
or group agree message. If after a timeout period (which is a system parameter), RSU still
cannot receive the acknowledgement from Vi, it assumes that the message is corrupted on
its way to Vi . More than one vehicle may not acknowledge. RSU then resends the previous
broadcast to all these vehicles but this time, IDj and CENCmj(rr) of all vehicles Vj who have
acknowledged do not need to be included in the broadcast anymore. In Section 8, we will
show that acknowledgements are important in increasing the group formation success rate.
Each vehicle in the group then stores all the group public keys and the decrypted rr values.
6.2 Secure one-to-many and one-to-one communications
In this sub-section, we describe how a vehicle can send a message securely to all other
members or to a dedicated member in the group in detail. We also describe how a vehicle
can sign a message so that another member can ensure the message is indeed sent by it. We
consider the communication between two vehicles in a group as a local communication.
One-to-many communications. The vehicles in the group compute a common group secret as
β = s× rr (note that RSU does not know how to compute β since s is only known by vehicles
but not RSU) and they can communicate with each other securely using any symmetric key
cryptographic algorithm such as DES [Brown et al. (1993)] from now on.
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One-to-one communications. Based on the stored group public key GPKj, when vehicle Vi
wants to send a message Mi to another member Vj , it first generates a random number x.
It then computes the ciphertext Ci = {xP,Mi + sxGPKj}. To decrypt, it multiplies xP by
smj and subtracts the result from the second part to obtain Mi as Mi + sxGPKj − xsmjP =
Mi + sxmjP − xsmjP = Mi. We denote the encryption and decryption processes here as
Ci = EENCGPKj(Mi) and Mi = EDECmj (Ci), respectively.
Local message signing and verification. Next we look at the local pseudo identity generation,
message signing and signature verification when group communications (either one-to-many
or one-to-one) take place. To denote the local nature, we add the character L in front of the
notations LIDi and LSKi. When vehicle Vi wants to send a local message Mi, it first generates
its local pseudo identity LIDi = (LIDi1,LIDi2) where LIDi1 = rP and LIDi2 = GPKi + rβP. r
is again a random nonce here. Then it composes its local signing key LSKi = (LSKi1,LSKi2)
as LSKi1 = smiLIDi1 and LSKi2 = smiH(LIDi2) where H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function as
before. It signs the message Mi by computing the local signature ς i = LSKi1 + h(Mi)LSKi2
where h(.) is a one-way hash function (note that we use a different notation to differentiate
it from a non-local signature). Finally, it sends to others < LIDi,Ci,ς i > where Ci is the
ciphertext corresponding to Mi.
Assume vehicle Vj wants to verify the signature of Vi on Mi. It first retrieves Vi’s group
public key GPKi by computing LIDi2 − βLIDi1 because LIDi2 − βLIDi1 = GPKi + rβP −
βrP = GPKi. Then it decrypts Ci to obtain Mi and checks whether eˆ(ς i,P) = eˆ(LIDi1 +
h(Mi)H(LIDi2), sGPKi) as
eˆ(ς i,P)
= eˆ(LSKi1 + h(Mi)LSKi2,P)
= eˆ(LSKi1,P)eˆ(h(Mi)LSKi2,P)
= eˆ(smiLIDi1,P)eˆ(h(Mi)smiH(LIDi2),P)
= eˆ(LIDi1, smiP)eˆ(h(Mi)H(LIDi2), smiP)
= eˆ(LIDi1, sGPKi)eˆ(h(Mi)H(LIDi2), sGPKi)
= eˆ(LIDi1 + h(Mi)H(LIDi2), sGPKi).
6.3 New member joining
Assume that vehicle Vk wants to join the group of Vi, namely, (V1, . . . ,Vn) which are in the
range of the same RSU and the shared secret between Vk and RSU is mk.
Group join. Vk first composes a group join message Mk =< GPJOIN, IDi > with its signature
σk on it. It sends < IDk,Mk,σk > to the closest RSU. Note that IDi is the pseudo identity lastly
used by Vi as seen by Vk. It is not a local pseudo identity since Vk still has not joined Vi’s group
yet. Also Vk generates its pseudo identity IDk and signature σk in the same manner as other
vehicles when they send out their group request or group agree messages.
Group join agree. When Vi finds that its last used pseudo identity is inside Vk’s group join
message, Vi replies with a group join agree message< IDi,Mi,σi > where IDi is generated as
usual and Mi = {GPJOINAGR||IDk||CENCCPKR(rr)}.
Verification by RSU and key generation. Upon receiving the group join and group join agree
messages from Vk and Vi, respectively, RSU verifies them. RSU then generates Vk’s group
public key as GPKk = mkP. It broadcasts Mr = {IDk||IDi||GPKk||GPKi,CENCmk(rr)} and its
signature CSIGCSKR(Mr) to Vk and Vi.
Key reception and acknowledgement. Upon receiving RSU’s broadcast, Vj where j ∈ {i,k}
verifies RSU’s signature and acknowledges it by composing Mj = {KEYRECV} and sending
out the reply < IDj,Mj,σj >. Note that IDj and σj are generated in the same way as in the
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group join or group join agree message. If after a timeout period, RSU still cannot receive
the acknowledgement from either Vk or Vi, it resends the previous broadcast to it. Vk then
decrypts CENCmk(rr) using its shared secret with RSU mk and computes the common group
secret as β = s× rr.
Sharing of group public keys. Up to this moment, only Vi knows how to verify signatures
by Vk . Thus Vi shares this piece of information with other members by composing the
messageMi = {NEWMEMBER||GPKk} and broadcasting< LIDi,Mi,ς i> to other members.
Each member Vj verifies the signature of Vi and acknowledges Vi with the reply message
< LIDj,Mj,ς j >where LIDj is the local pseudo identity ofVj and Mj = {GPKRECV}. If after
a timeout period, Vi still cannot receive the acknowledgement from any member, it resends
the previous broadcast to it.
After all, one task is still missing. That is to inform Vk about how to verify other
members’ signatures. This task is again assigned to Vi. Vi composes the message Mi =
{GPK1,GPK2, ...,GPKi−1, GPKi+1, ...,GPKn} and sends< LIDi,Mi,ς i > to Vk. Upon receiving
Vi’s message, Vk acknowledges it like what other members do.
6.4 Common group secret update
Now we show how to update the common group secret β periodically without the help of
RSU. Each member Vi can periodically request a key update by broadcasting the message
< LIDi,Mi,ς i >where LIDi is the local pseudo identity of Vi and Mi = {CGSUPDATE}. The
requester Vi then generates a new random number rrnew and computes βnew = rrnew × s. It
sends to each other member Vj the message < LIDi,Mi,ς i > where LIDi is the local pseudo
identity of Vi and Mi = {NEWCGS,EENCGPKj(βnew)}.
Each Vj acknowledges Vi with the reply message < LIDj,Mj,ς j > where LIDj is the local
pseudo identity of Vj and Mj = {NEWCGSRECV}. If after a timeout period, Vi still cannot
receive the acknowledgement from Vj, it resends the previous message to it. Note that the
acknowledgements here ensure that all members staying in the group can receive the new
common group secret properly for ongoing one-to-many communications.
6.5 Member leaving
When a member Vk wants to leave a group, the group common secret should be updated so
that Vk can no longer decrypt the group’s ongoing communications. We can simply conduct a
group key update protocol excluding Vk.
6.6 Real identity tracking
Again only TA can trace the real identity of the sender of a message. For vehicle Vi’s group
request or group agreemessage, TA can trace Vi’s real identity using the routine in Section 5.4.
For vehicle Vi’s local message to other members, the connecting RSU first retrieves Vi’s group
public key GPKi by computing LIDi2 − βLIDi1 similar to what the receiver does. Then it
looks up its verification table to retrieveVi’s verification public key VPKi which was assigned
by TA. By presenting VPKi, TA can search through all the stored (RIDj, tj,mj) tuples from
its repository. Vehicle Vi’s real identity is the RIDj value from the entry that satisfies the
expression RIDj = tj ⊕VPKi.
7. Analysis
7.1 Security analysis
We analyse our schemes with respect to the security requirements listed in Section 3.
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Message integrity and authentication: For ad hoc messages, the signature σi on message Mi by
vehicle Vi is composed of SKi1 and SKi2. SKi1 is defined as smi IDi1 where mi is the shared
secret between vehicle Vi and the RSU. Due to the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm
problem, there is no way for attackers to reveal mi. Thus the attacker cannot forge a signature.
Similarly, for group message, although all vehicles in the group know the group public key
GPKi = miP of Vi, it is computationally hard to obtain mi due to the same reason. Thus no
other vehicle knows how to compose SKi1. SKi2, on the other hand, is defined as sH(IDi2).
Recall IDi2=VPKi⊕H(miIDi1). Again, since no other vehicle knowsmi, onlyVi can compute
SKi2. Therefore, no other vehicle can forge a valid signature by vehicle Vi. Note also that RSUs
do not know the master secret s, and thus cannot forge a message either.
For local messages, the signature ς i on message Mi by vehicle Vi is composed of LSKi1 and
LSKi2. LSKi1 is defined as smiLIDi1. Due to the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm
problem, there is no way for attackers to reveal mi. LSKi2, on the other hand, is defined as
smiH(LIDi2). Again, since no other vehicle knows mi, only Vi can compute LSKi2. Therefore,
no other vehicle can forge a valid signature by vehicle Vi. Again note that RSUs do not know
the master secret s, and thus cannot forge a message either.
In practice, RSUs can be cracked easily and this is unavoidable. However, we can implement
additional measures in our schemes to reduce the impact. For example, we can classify
messages into different security levels. For critical messages, we can require them to be
verified by TA instead of by RSUs. Or we can have another variation under which a message
can only be trusted if it is verified by multiple consecutive RSUs. We believe with these
measures, even if a few RSUs are cracked, the damage is limited.
Identity privacy preserving: We argue that if Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard,
then the pseudo identity of a vehicle can preserve its real identity. The proof is as follows:
We consider a game between a challenger and an attacker. The challenger starts by giving a set
of system parameters including P and Ppub. The attacker then freely chooses two verification
public keys VPK0 and VPK1 and sends them to the challenger (these choices do not need
to be random, the attacker can choose them in any way it desires). The challenger sets a bit
x = 0 with probability 12 and sets x = 1 with probability
1
2 . The challenger then sends the
attacker the pseudo identity corresponding to VPKb together with the group public key. The
attacker tries to guess the value of x, and outputs its guess, x′. The attacker’s advantage in the
game is defined to be Pr[x = x′]− 12 . We say that our pseudo identity generation algorithm
is semantically secure against a chosen plain text attack (CPA) if the attacker’s advantage is
negligible.
Next we assume that we have an algorithm A which runs in polynomial time and has a
non-negligible advantage e as the attacker in the game described above. We will construct
a DDH attacker B which has access to A and achieves a non-negligible advantage. B is given
(P, aP,bP,T) as input. We let t denote the bit that B is trying to guess (i.e. T = abP when t= 0
and is set randomly otherwise). B gives A (P,Ppub = aP) as input. (Note that a now plays the
role of s in our scheme.) A then chooses two verification public keys VPK0 and VPK1 which it
has queried for the corresponding group public keys m0P and m1P before and sends them to
B. B is playing the role of challenger here, so it sets a bit x randomly and generates the pseudo
identity ID = (ID1, ID2) where ID1 = raP, ID2 = VPKb ⊕ H(rT) and r is a random nonce to
send to A. B also sends A the group public key bP. (Note that b now plays the role of mi in
our scheme.) A sends B a bit x′, which is its guess for x. B guesses that t= 0 if x = x′.
If t = 0 (so T = abP), then ID2 = VPKb ⊕ H(rabP) = VPKb ⊕ H(bID1) is a valid pseudo
identity. In this case, A will guess b correctly with probability 12 + . Thus, Pr[Bsucceeds|t=
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0] = 12 + . If t= 1, we claim that Pr[Bsucceeds|t= 1] =
1
2 . To see why, we observe that when T
is randomly chosen, H(rT) cannot be cancelled by ID1 and so there is no way to obtain VPKb.
Thus it reveals no information about x. In this sense, the value of x is hidden to A, so the
probability that Awill guess it is simply 12 . Hence, Pr[Bsucceeds] =
1
2 (
1
2 + ) +
1
2
1
2 =
1
2 + /2.
Since  is non-negligible, this shows that B violates the assumption that DDH is hard.
Furthermore, the random nonce r makes the pseudo identity of a vehicle different in different
messages. Also since the verification public key VPKi of a certain vehicle is different as seen
by different RSUs, even if all RSUs collude, they have no way to trace a particular vehicle’s
travelling route.
Traceability: Section 5.4 shows that TA is able to trace a vehicle’s real identity, thus traceability
is satisfied.
Confidentiality: For one-to-one communications in a group, the message Mj to Vj is masked by
the component sxGPKj. To remove the mask, one has to present the first point xP, s and mj.
However, mj is the shared secret between Vj and RSU. Also s is the master key of TA known
by vehicles and TA only. Therefore, other than Vj, any other vehicles as well as RSU do not
know how to obtain Mj.
For one-to-many communications in a group, any message is encrypted using the common
group secret β = s× rr. Since the partial secret rr is transmitted securely from RSU to each
vehicle in the group, vehicles outside the group have no knowledge about it. In addition,
since s is known by vehicles and TA only, RSU does not know how to decrypt the message
either.
7.2 Analysis on bloom filter approach
This sub-section analyses our newly-proposed bloom filter approach in the verification
notification phase. We first show that the probability of having false positives is very small
if we set the parameters for the bloom filters appropriately, then we show that our message
overhead is about 10 times lower than that under the RAISE protocol. Note that the IBV
protocol does not have a notification phase, so we only compare ourswith the RAISE protocol.
The probability of having a false positive in our bloom filter approach (i.e., Case 3 in Table 2)
is equal to the probability that all k bits are set in one bloom filter while not all k bits are set in
another bloom filter. Thus the probability of Case 3 is Pr(Case3) = 2(1− (1− 1m )
kn)k(1− (1−
(1 − 1m )
kn)k) ∼ 2(1 − e−
kn
m )k(1− (1− e−
kn
m )k). Interestingly we find that the value of k that
minimizes the false positive probability of a single bloom filter (i.e. k = m ln2n ) also minimizes
Pr(Case 3) approximately (up to 5 decimal places) based on our empirical results. Hence
we set the number of hash functions to m ln2n in our schemes and Pr(Case3) ∼ 2(0.6185
m
n (1−
0.6185
m
n )). It can be shown that when mn = 5, Pr(Case3) is about 0.16. When
m
n = 10, Pr(Case3)
drops to 0.016 only. That is, if there are 100 signatures in a batch, on average only 1 to 2
signatures are affected by bloom filter false positive and need to be re-confirmed.
Now, we analyze the message overhead. Assume that there are n signatures in a batch. For the
RAISE protocol, the HMAC() value sent by each vehicle is 16 bytes long while the H() value
sent by the RSU in the notification phase is 16 bytes long per message. After that RSU signs
the notification message using an ECDSA signature which is 56 bytes long. Together with a
message header of 2 bytes, the total message overhead for verifying a batch of n signatures is
16n+ 16n+ 56+ 2= 32n+ 58 bytes.
For our schemes, the ECC signature sent by each vehicle is 21 bytes long. In the notification
phase, we use two bloom filters. To lower the false positive rate in any bloom filter, the total
number of bits used in each bloom filter is set to 10 times the number of signatures in the batch
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(i.e. mn = 10). We have two bloom filters and so a total of
20n
8 = 2.5n bytes are needed. We also
use 2 bytes to represent the number of signatures in a batch. Together with a message header
of 2 bytes, the total message overhead for verifying a batch of n signatures is 21n+ 2.5n+ 2+
56+ 2= 23.5n+ 60 bytes.
Note that when Case 3 occurs, additional message overhead is required for the re-confirmation
procedures. If Case 3 only occurs in the first trial and does not occur in the second trial, the
total message overhead for verifying a batch of n signatures becomes 23.5n+ 60+ P(23.5n+
60) = (1 + P)(23.5n + 60) bytes where P = Pr(Case3). Hence, if Case 3 occurs in all the
first K trials and we switch to the hash approach after that, the total message overhead
becomes ∑ki=1 P
i(23.5n + 60) + Pk(37n + 58) bytes. The component Pk(37n + 58) represents
the message overhead used for the hash approach after K trials. That is, 21 bytes for each ECC
signature, 16 bytes for each H() value, 56 bytes for ECDSA signature and 2 bytes for message
header. Since P is about 0.016, even if K is only 2, the overhead of our scheme is much lower
than that of RAISE. And we found that as long as K > 1, the overhead is similar in different
values of K since the probability of Case 3 is very low, so re-confirmation is quite unlikely.
In Fig. 5, we set the value of K to 1, 2, 3 and 5, respectively, and with mn set to 5 and 10. We can
see that with all values of K and mn , the message overhead by our schemes is far lower than that
by the RAISE protocol due to the use of ECC signatures and bloom filters in the notification
phase. For our schemes, when mn = 5, the more the number of trials before switching to hash
approach, the lower the message overhead. When mn = 10, the lines with K = 2, K = 3 and
K = 5 overlap. It means that with mn = 10 and as long as K > 1, the probability of Case 3 is
very low and so re-confirmation is quite unlikely.
Fig. 5. Data transmission vs. number of signatures in the batch
209i - nabled and Privacy-Enhancing Communications Schemes for VANETs
18 Theory and Applications of Ad Hoc Networks
8. Simulation results
In this section, we evaluate the network performance of our Grouping-enabled and
Privacy-enhancing communications Scheme (GPS) in details. For ad hoc communications,
we compare our scheme with the IBV protocol in terms of (1) the verification delay and (2)
verification success rate through simulations. Note that IBV also uses a batch verification
scheme, and so is much faster than the RAISE protocol. Thus, we compare the delay of our
scheme with the IBV [Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008)] protocol. For success rate, we expect
we will have a similar performance as RAISE as we will both identify all valid signatures
even if there are invalid ones within the same batch. So, we compare our performance with
the IBV protocol. We show that our scheme can verify more signatures while the additional
delay required is insignificant. For group communications, we first compare our scheme with
the RAISE protocol in terms of group message transmission delay. We expect we will have
lower delay since group messages do not need to be verified by RSUs in our scheme. Next,
we compare our GPS scheme with the SPECS protocol (group communications extension)
[Chim, Yiu, Hui, Jiang & Li (2009)] in terms of (1) the group request delay and (2) group
request success rate. We show that the success rate of forming a group using our scheme
with the acknowledgement message is a lot higher than that of the SPECS scheme (with
group communications extension) if the wireless channel is noisy. Then, we show that the
delay introduced by retransmissions in our scheme is only marginal. Finally, we show the
performance of our scheme in terms of key update average delay and member joining average
delay as the number of vehicles in a group varies.
8.1 Simulation models
Some of the settings of our simulation are adopted from [Zhang, Lu, Lin, Ho & Shen (2008);
Zhang, Lin, Lu & Ho (2008); Chim, Yiu, Hui, Jiang & Li (2009)]. We consider a highway of
length 10 km and a number of RSUs are installed along it. The RVC and the IVC ranges are
set to 600m and 300m, respectively. The bandwidth of the channel is 6 Mb/s and the average
length of inter-vehicle message is 200 bytes. We compute the transmission time based on the
bandwidth and the length of the message. The RSU performs batch verification every 300 ms
and each pairing operation takes 4.5 ms [Scott (2007)]. We implement the simulation using
C++.
For ad hoc communications, we assume that vehicles pass through an RSU at speeds varying
from 50 km/h to 70 km/h. Our simulation runs for 1000 s. Inter-vehicle messages are sent
every 500 ms from each vehicle. IEEE 802.11a is used to simulate the medium access control
layer. (We simulate the IEEE 802.11a protocol by generating the time stamps for broadcasting
messages of each vehicle. In case two stamps are identical, we randomly regenerate one of
them.) We vary the total number of vehicles that have ever entered the RSU’s RVC range
during the simulation period from 200 to 1000 in steps of 200 to simulate the impact of
different traffic densities. We also vary the inter-vehicle message signature error rate from
1% to 10% to study its impact on the performance of our scheme. For each configuration, we
compute the average of 5 different random scenarios.
For group communications, the number of RSUs is a variable and these RSUs are evenly
distributed along the given highway. Groups of vehicles are travelling on it at speeds
varying from 50 km/h to 70 km/h. For each group, the number of vehicles is a variable
and the vehicles are travelling on the road one after another. To simulate a noisy wireless
channel (e.g. signal interference and signal blocking by obstacles or other signals), we use
corruption rate. Since channel collision is also a kind of noise, we incorporate it into our
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corruption rate as well for simplicity. If the corruption rate is cr%, a transmitted message is
corrupted with probability cr%. We vary the corruption rate from 5% to 50% in steps of 5%
to investigate its impact on the group request success rate and group request average delay.
For each configuration, we compute the average of 20 different random scenarios (since we
find that the standard deviation of the results is larger than that in experiments for ad hoc
communications). The simulation runs for 1 hour and for every minute, there will be a new
group of vehicles. For each group, one group request is issued.
8.2 Simulation results for ad hoc communications
We fix the signature error rate (the percentage of invalid signatures) to 5% and vary the total
number of vehicles that have entered the RSU’s range throughout the simulation. We only
consider batches that contain invalid signatures (Invalid batch). In [Zhang, Lin, Lu & Ho
(2008)], the expression for verification success rate is defined. We extend its definition to
handle invalid batch: IBSR = 1N ∑
N
i=1
Miapp
Mimac
, where Miapp is the total number of messages that
are successfully verified by the RSU and are consumed by vehicle Vi in the application layer
before vehicle Vi leaves RSU’s RVC range, Mimac is the total number of messages received
by both vehicle Vi and RSU in the medium access control layer from other vehicles. For our
scheme, we can have different levels of binary search as mentioned in Section 5. We use the
notation GPS(BSx) to denote our scheme with x levels of binary search.
The verification success rates for the scheme are shown in Fig. 6. Note that the success rates
for IBV and GPS(BS0) are 0% as both will drop the whole invalid batch. From our simulation,
we found that even if we only have 1 level of binary search, the success rate of GPS(BS1) is
already raised to about 45%. If we increase the number of levels to 4, the success rate can be
raised to more than 90%.
Fig. 6. Invalid batch success rate vs. number of vehicles
While the results are quite obvious, next we will show that the delay incurred by binary
search procedure is minimal. Fig. 7 shows the delay performance. We define the average
delay suffered by vehicles as MD = 1N ∑
N
i=1
1
M ∑
M
m=1(T
m
ver f − T
m
recv), where M is the number
of messages received by vehicle Vi, Tmver f is the time that vehicle Vi receives the verification
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notification message of message m from RSU and Tmrecv is the time that vehicle Vi receives
message m from its neighboring vehicle. From Fig. 7, we can see that the delay under the
IBV protocol and our scheme are very close to each other. For our scheme, as expected, with
higher levels of binary search, longer delay is induced because more pairing operations are
involved. However, even in the worst case (i.e. using 4 levels of binary search), our scheme
only consumes an additional 10 ms which is roughly equivalent to the delay caused by 2
pairing operations. This is due to two main reasons. Not all cases require 4 levels of binary
search and the time for each pairing operation is comparatively smaller than the transmission
delay, so we can afford to do more pairing operations. One more interesting point to note is
that without binary search, our scheme consumes 5 less ms than the IBV protocol. The reason
is that our scheme requires 2 pairing operations only while the IBV protocol requires 3 as
mentioned in Section 5.
Fig. 7. Delay vs. number of vehicles
In the second set of experiments, we fix the number of vehicles that have entered RSU’s RVC
range during the simulation period to 300 and vary the signature error rate from 1% to 10%
to investigate its impact on the invalid batch success rate and the message delay. We only
consider batches that contain invalid signatures. Fig. 8 shows the results. The IBV and
GPS(BS0) cases are not interesting as they drop all invalid batches. And it is also quite obvious
that as the level of binary search increases, the success rate increases. The interesting point is
that as the error rate increases from 1% to 10%, our scheme only degrades less than 10%.
The corresponding delay performance is shown in Fig. 9. As discussed earlier, GPS(BS0)
gives a lower delay than the IBV protocol due to the saving of one pairing operation. As the
error rate increases, more batches contain invalid signatures. Additional pairing operations
are required to locate valid signatures. This increases the average delay. But the gap between
our scheme and the IBV protocol is only about 10ms even when the error rate is 10%.
8.3 Simulation results for group communications
In the first set of experiments, we put aside the impact of interference and obstacles by setting
the corruption rate to 0%. We vary the number of RSUs along the highway from 2 to 10.
These RSUs are then evenly distributed along the highway. We define the group message
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Fig. 8. Invalid batch success rate vs. error rate
Fig. 9. Delay vs. error rate
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transmission delay as the period from when a vehicle sends a message to when another
vehicle in the same group verifies the message properly. We investigate the average group
transmission delay under the RAISE protocol and our scheme as more RSUs are installed
along the highway. From Fig. 10, we can see that under the RAISE protocol, the average
group message transmission delay increases as RSUs become less dense along the highway.
However, under our scheme, the average groupmessage transmission delay remains constant
(and near zero) no matter how dense the RSUs are. It is because under the RAISE protocol,
all messages need to be verified by RSUs. When a vehicle wants to send a message to another
group member, it first waits for a nearby RSU ahead of its journey. Then it waits for its batch
verification period to expire. However, in our scheme, an initial RSU has already passed the
necessary verification information (group public keys) to all vehicles in the group and so they
know how to verify the signatures of each other without further support from RSUs. Thus the
above two waiting periods are no longer needed.
Fig. 10. Average group message transmission delay vs. number of RSUs
In the second set of experiments, we vary the corruption rate from 5% (low interference
environment) to 50% (high interference environment) and study its impact on the group
request success rate and the corresponding average delay. For each corruption rate, we further
try different initial (before any new member joins) group sizes (n = 5, 10, 15 and 20). A
group request is considered to be successful if all members in the group receive necessary
information (i.e. group public keys of all others and the group partial secret) from the initial
RSU for group communications. The group request success rate is defined as the number
of successful requests divided by the total number of group requests made. The group
request delay is defined a bit differently under SPECS and our GPS scheme. For the SPECS
protocol, it is defined as the period from when any vehicle in the group first sends out a
group request message to when all vehicles in the group receive necessary information for
group communications. For our scheme, it is defined as the period from when any vehicle
in the group first sends out a group request message to when RSU received and verified the
acknowledgement messages from all vehicles in the group. The group request average delay
is just the average of the group request delay among all successful group requests.
From Fig. 11, we can see that by requiring vehicles to acknowledge RSU, our scheme always
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gives 100% group request success rate no matter how many vehicles are in the group. For
SPECS, without any acknowledgement mechanism, the group request success rate drops
gradually as the corruption rate increases from 5% to 50%. In particular, the more vehicles
in the group, the lower the group request success rate. It is because with more vehicles in a
group, the probability that all vehicles receive a message properly becomes lower.
Fig. 11. Group request success rate vs. corruption rate
Fig. 12 shows the corresponding delay performance. We can see that larger groups are
subjected to higher group request delay. This makes sense since with more vehicles in a group,
the probability that all vehicles receive a message properly becomes lower. As a result, to
ensure that all vehicles receive the message, more re-transmissions are needed. Thus higher
delay is caused.
Next we focus on the case with 10 vehicles in a group to investigate the performance difference
between SPECS and our scheme. From Fig. 13, we can see that our scheme gives a bit higher
delay as the corruption rate increases due to increased number of re-transmissions. However,
the increase is just marginal (less than 2 ms).
In the third set of experiments, we again vary the corruption rate from 5% to 50% and study
its impact on the key update average delay under our scheme. A key update is considered
to be successful if all vehicles in the group obtain the new group common secret. The key
update delay is defined as the period from when any vehicle in the group sends out a key
update request message to when it receives and verifies acknowledgement messages from all
other vehicles in the group. The key update average delay is defined as the average of the key
update delay among all successful key updates.
Fig. 14 shows that as more vehicles are involved in the group, higher key update delay is
required. It is because with more vehicles in a group, the probability that all vehicles receive a
message properly becomes lower. As a result, to ensure that all vehicles receive the message,
more re-transmissions are needed. Thus higher delay is caused.
In the last set of experiments, we also vary the corruption rate from 5% to 50% but this time,
we study its impact on the member joining average delay under our scheme. A member
joining event is considered to be successful if all old members in the group obtain the new
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Fig. 12. Group request average delay vs. corruption rate
Fig. 13. Group request average delay vs. corruption rate
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Fig. 14. Key update average delay vs. corruption rate
member’s group public key while at the same time, the new member obtains all oldmembers’
group public keys and the group common secret for future communications. The member
joining delay is defined as the period from when the new member sends out a group join
request message to when the old member it contacts receives and verifies acknowledgement
messages from all members. The member joining average delay is defined as the average of
the member joining delay among all successful member joining events.
In Fig. 15, we study two initial (before any new member joins) group sizes (n= 5 and 10), and
two new member set sizes, (j= 5 and 10) under our scheme. All configurations show slightly
increasing trends as the corruption rate increases because of the same reason above. Also the
delay performance under all configurations are actually close to each other and the difference
is just about 10 ms.
Fig. 15. Member joining average delay vs. corruption rate
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9. Conclusions
In this chapter, we discussed the Grouping-enabled and Privacy-enhancing communications
Schemes (GPS) for VANETs to handle ad hoc messages and group messages for inter-vehicle
communications. For ad hoc messages, we follow the approach of letting RSU aid the
signature verification process. We show that our schemes satisfy the security and privacy
requirements. In terms of effectiveness, we show that our solution gives lower message
overhead and at least 45 % higher success rate than previous work. For group messages,
we proposed a set of modules for VANETs which allows dynamic membership and periodic
update of the group key. RSU is needed only for group formation and member joining. In
addition, we provide an add-on function for a group member to send a secure message to all
other members or to a dedicated member. Again we show that our schemes satisfy all the
security requirements. By simulation, we verify that our schemes are effective and the delay
introduced by re-transmitting lost messages is negligible.
Note that in the early stage of VANET deployment, we may not have RSUs installed in all
road sections. However, our protocol can be completed within the coverage of one RSU, and
so can still be applied. Individual vehicles just cannot communicate on those sections of roads
without RSUs, however, vehicles in the same group can still communicate without RSU. For
future work, we will extend our group communications schemes to allow groupmerging and
group splitting. We will also consider other secure applications in VANETs.
10. References
Boneh, D., Lynn, B. & Shacham, H. (2001). Short Signatures from the Weil Pairing, Proceedings
of Asiacrypt ’01, pp. 514 – 532.
Brown, R. H., Good, M. L. & Prabhakar, A. (1993). Data Encryption Standard (DES), Federal
Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 46-2 .
Chim, T., Yiu, S., Hui, L. C., Jiang, Z. L. & Li, V. O. (2009). SPECS: Secure and Privacy
Enhancing Communications Schemes for VANETs, ADHOCNETS ’09.
Chim, T., Yiu, S., Hui, L. C. & Li, V. O. (2009). Security and Privacy Issues for Inter-vehicle
Communications in VANETs, IEEE Proceedings of the SECON ’09 (Poster Session).
Eastlake, D. & Jones, P. (2001). US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1), IETF RFC3174 .
Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. & Solo, D. (1999). Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and CRL Profile, IETF RFC2459 .
Hubaux, J. P., Capkun, S. & Lui, J. (2004). The Security and Privacy of Smart Vehicles, IEEE
Security and Privacy Magazine, 2(3) pp. 49 – 55.
Kim, Y., Perrig, A. & Tsudik, G. (2004). Tree-based group key agreement, ACM Transactions on
Information Systems Security, 7(1) pp. 60 – 96.
Menezes, A. (1991). An Introduction to Pairing-Based Cryptography, 1991 Mathematics Subject
Classification, Primary 94A60.
Oh, H., Yae, C., Ahn, D. & Cho, H. (1999). 5.8 GHz DSRC Packet Communication System for
ITS Services, IEEE Proceedings of the VTC ’99, pp. 2223 – 2227.
Raya, M., Papadimitratos, P. &Hubaux, J. P. (2006). Securing Vehicular Communications, IEEE
Wireless Communications Magazine, Special Issue on Inter-Vehicular Communications
pp. 8 – 15.
Scott, M. (2007). Efficient implementation of cryptographic pairings, Available online:
http://ecrypt-ss07.rhul.ac.uk/Slides/Thursday/mscott-samos07.pdf.
Tsang, P. P. & Smith, S. W. (2008). PPAA: Peer-to-Peer Anonymous Authentication, Proceedings
18 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks: Applications
Grouping-Enabled and Privacy-Enhancing Communications Schemes for VANETs 27
of ACNS ’08, pp. 55 – 74.
U.S. Department of Transportation, N. H. T. S. A. (2006). Vehicle Safety Communications
Project Report.
Verma, M. & Huang, D. (2009). SeGCom: Secure Group Communication in VANETs, IEEE
Proceedings of the CCNC ’09, pp. 1 – 5.
Wang, F., Zeng, D. & Yang, L. (2006). Smart Cars on Smart Roads: an IEEE Intelligent
Transportation Systems Society Update, IEEE Pervasive Computing, Vol. 5, No. 4 pp. 68
– 69.
Wasef, A. & Shen, X. (2008). PPGCV: Privacy Preserving Group Communications Protocol for
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE Proceedings of the ICC ’08, pp. 1458 – 1463.
Wong, C. K., Gouda, M. & Lam, S. S. (1998). Secure group communications using key graphs,
IEEE Proceedings of the SIGCOMM ’98, pp. 68 – 79.
Zhang, C., Lin, X., Lu, R. & Ho, P. H. (2008). RAISE: An Efficient RSU-aided Message
Authentication Scheme in Vehicular Communication Networks, IEEE Proceedings of
the ICC ’08, pp. 1451 – 1457.
Zhang, C., Lu, R., Lin, X., Ho, P. H. & Shen, X. (2008). An Efficient Identity-based
Batch Verification Scheme for Vehicular Sensor Networks, IEEE Proceedings of the
INFOCOM ’08, pp. 816 – 824.
11. Appendix - attacks to IBV protocol
In this section, we first describe the IBV protocol. Then, we describe in details three security
problems of the protocol - privacy violation, anti-traceability attack, and impersonation attack.
11.1 The IBV protocol
Before network deployment, TA sets up the parameters using the following steps:
1. TA chooses G and GT that satisfy the bilinear map properties.
2. TA randomly picks s1, s2 ∈ Zq as its master keys. These two master keys are preloaded
into each vehicle’s tamper-proof hardware device.
3. TA then computes Ppub1 = s1P and Ppub2 = s2P as its public keys. The parameters {G, GT ,
q, P, Ppub1 , Ppub2} are then preloaded into all RSUs and OBUs.
4. TA also assigns each vehicle Vi a real identity RIDi ∈ G and a password PWDi. The drivers
are informed about them during network deployment or during vehicle first registration.
When a vehicle Vi starts up, its RIDi and PWDi are input by the driver into a tamper-proof
device. If they are valid, the tamper-proof device starts its role in generating pseudo
identities, secret keys and message signing. Vehicle Vi’s pseudo identity is generated as
IDi = (IDi1, IDi2) where IDi1 = rP and IDi2 = RIDi ⊕ H(rPpub1) where r is a per-session
random nonce. Its secret key is then generated as SKi = (SKi1,SKi2) where SKi1 = s1 IDi1 and
SKi2 = s2H(IDi1||IDi2). Here H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function as in our schemes. When
vehicle Vi wants to send the message Mi, it generates the signature σi = SKi1 + h(Mi)SKi2
where h(.) is a one-way hash function such as SHA-1. Vi then broadcasts IDi, Mi and σi to the
RSU.
RSU verifies the signature σi by checking whether eˆ(σi,P) =
eˆ(IDi1,Ppub1)eˆ(h(Mi)H(IDi1||IDi2),Ppub2) as
eˆ(σi ,P)
= eˆ(SKi1 + h(Mi)SKi2,P)
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= eˆ(SKi1,P)eˆ(h(Mi)SKi2,P)
= eˆ(s1 IDi1,P)eˆ(h(Mi)s2H(IDi1||IDi2),P)
= eˆ(IDi1, s1P)eˆ(h(Mi)H(IDi1||IDi2), s2P)
= eˆ(IDi1,Ppub1)eˆ(h(Mi)H(IDi1||IDi2),Ppub2)
Having the pseudo identity IDi of vehicle Vi , TA can trace its real identity by using the TA
RID Tracing Routine: IDi2 ⊕ H(s1 IDi1) = RIDi ⊕ H(rPpub1)⊕ H(s1rP) = RIDi.
11.2 Privacy violation
Any vehicle can obtain IDi = (IDi1, IDi2) from Vi’s transmissions. Also s1 is preloaded into
each vehicle’s tamper-proof device during network deployment. Thus any vehicle can obtain
Vi’s RIDi by following the TA RID Tracing Routine.
11.3 Anti-traceability attack
We describe how a vehicle can make TA unable to trace its real identity from its message sent
under the IBV protocol. We denote this kind of attack as an anti-traceability attack.
Assume that in a certain session, the attacking vehicle Va generates its pseudo identity as
IDa = (IDa1, IDa2)where IDa1 = rP and IDa2 = GARBAGE⊕H(aPpub1)where GARBAGE∈
G and r is again a per-session random nonce. Va then proceeds to generate its secret keys
SKa = (SKa1,SKa2) where SKa1 = s1 IDa1 and SKa2 = s2H(IDa1||IDa2), signs the message Ma
by generating the signature σa = SKa1+ h(Ma)SKa2 and sends out IDa, Ma and σa to the RSU.
Note that RSU can verify the message successfully because eˆ(σa,P) =
eˆ(IDa1,Ppub1)eˆ(h(Ma)H(IDa1||IDa2),Ppub2). Assume that at a later time, Va’s message
Ma causes an accident on the road. RSU forwards Va’s pseudo identity to TA
so as to reveal Va’s real identity. However, upon computing IDa2 ⊕ H(s1 IDa1) =
GARBAGE ⊕ H(rPpub1) ⊕ H(s1rP) = GARBAGE, TA finds that GARBAGE does not
match any record at TA. Va can thus evade its responsibility of causing the accident.
11.4 Impersonation attack
We describe how a vehicle can send messages on behalf of another under the IBV protocol.
We denote this kind of attack as an impersonation attack.
Assume that at a certain instance, vehicle Vi with real identity RIDi generates its pseudo
identity IDi = (IDi1, IDi2), secret keys SKi and signs message Mi by generating the signature
σi as usual. While Vi is transmitting, an attacker Va records IDi. Later, Va generates the
message Ma. It generates its pseudo identity as IDa = (IDa1, IDa2) = IDi = (IDi1, IDi2)
and its secret keys as SKa = (SKa1,SKa2) where SKa1 = s1 IDa1 = s1 IDi1 and SKa2 =
s2H(IDa1||IDa2) = s2H(IDi1||IDi2). It then signs the messageMa by generating the signature
σa = SKa1+ h(Ma)SKa2 and sends out IDa, Ma and σa to the RSU.
Similar to the anti-traceability attack, upon receiving Va’s message, RSU can verify it
successfully because eˆ(σa,P) = eˆ(IDi1,Ppub1)eˆ(h(Ma)H(IDi1||IDi2),Ppub2). Assume at a later
time, Va’s message Ma causes an accident on the road. RSU forwards Va’s pseudo identity
IDa as shown in its message to TA so as to reveal its real identity. After computing
IDa2 ⊕ H(s1 IDa1) = IDi2 ⊕ H(s1 IDi1) = RIDi ⊕ H(rPpub1)⊕ H(s1rP) = RIDi, both RSU and
TA think that Ma is being sent by Vi because Vi’s instead ofVa’s identity is traced. Thus Va can
evade and pass its responsibility of causing the accident to Vi.
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